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Economics and political institutions
T
he “classical” economists, Adam Smith, David
Ricardo and Karl Marx clearly thought that
socio-political forces were important determinants of
economic development and change. In contrast, the
“neoclassical”,school starting with Jevons and Walras,
developed their economic theories in an institution-
free environment. Institution-free economic theory
has been the dominant school of thought at least until
the 1990s.There were, however, a few exceptions.
While the Anglo-Saxon School developed optimal
taxation theory in an institution free world, the
Italian Public Finance School of the late nineteenth
century embedded fiscal policy discussion and fiscal
theories into political considerations.
The classical constitutional theory of Hayek, set out
in his 1960 Constitution of Liberty and by Buchanan
and Tullock (The Calculus of Consent, 1960), pro-
vide a major normative pillar which greatly helps our
thinking today about the choice of institutions and
constitutions. The emphasis on the risks associated
with the tyranny of the majority remains one of their
major contributions.
The  Public Choice School developed around the
work of Buchanan and associates. The key idea of
this school of thought is that politicians maximize
self interest fairly narrowly defined.The government
is viewed as a Leviathan to be restrained because its
goal is to “steal” from the private sector extracting
taxes, rents and bribes.
Unfortunately, the Public Choice School remained
largely outside the mainstream of post-war eco-
nomic theory. Both sides are responsible for lack of
communication. Mainstream economists had a ten-
dency to underestimate the importance of institu-
tions, and they were quite narrow- minded in their
approach to modelling policy making, refusing to
understand the importance of politicians’ motiva-
tions and constraints in choosing policy. Or if they
did, they felt that it was not the economist’s role to
incorporate them in models of policymaking.Public
Choice theorists refused to embrace the method-
ological innovations in economic theory, such as a
new way of thinking about expectations,new devel-
opments in game theory and more generally the
mathematical and statistical rigor that was becom-
ing the norm in the field.
In the meantime the field of political science devel-
oped an area that was later known as the Rational
Choice approach, in which researchers applied
mathematical tools borrowed from economics to
analyze voting behaviour and various issues of polit-
ical institutions. This field owes a lot to Arrow’s
paper of 1951 on the impossibility theorem (in Social
Choice and Individual Values). In fact the initial
impetus from the field was to overcome the “nega-
tive”result by Arrow.Thus,models have been devel-
oped in which voting could be understood in a pre-
dictive manner.
William Nordhaus formalized the idea of an elec-
toral business cycle in a traditional Phillips curve
model with a stable trade-off between inflation and
unemployment (The Political Business Cycle,
1975). Immediately after this contribution macro-
economic theory moved to rational expectations,
and his contribution remained a bit on the sidelines
of the field.
Gary Becker offered, in his path-breaking paper in
1983 (A Theory of Competition Among Pressure
Groups for Political Influence), an approach to
modelling lobbying pressure to buy policy from pol-
icymakers. This approach was widely applied to
international trade and protectionist policies.
CHOICE OF CONSTITUTIONS AND
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
* This is a revised version of the CESifo Munich Lecture, held by
the author at 14 November 2006 in Munich.
** I thank Professors Hans-Werner Sinn and Raji Jayaraman for
their exceptionally kind hospitality in Munich, Guido Tabellini for
comments, and Carlo Prato and Maria Teresa Trenntinaglia for
research assistantship in the preparation of the lecture
(alesina@fas.harvard.edu).The New Political Economics
In the late 1980s a new line of research emerged,
sometimes referred to as “New Political Econo-
mics”. Contrary to the previous experience of the
Public Choice School, this area of research became
immediately fully integrated within the field of
economics and adopted the same methodologi-
cal tools of the latter.This approach quickly devel-
oped applications in virtually every field in eco-
nomics: macroeconomics, development, interna-
tional trade and finance, economic growth, public
finance, etc.
Perhaps the timing is not surprising. The 1980s
were a decade of great turmoil and transformation
in the American economy. President Reagan was
at the centre of this “revolution”.There were large
budget deficits, taxes were being cut and the econ-
omy deregulated. In contrast continental Europe
was entering a long period of sclerosis,some coun-
tries in Europe (but not all) were accumulating
debts that were rising to almost war time levels.
The need for structural reforms and liberalization
in Europe was evident, but they were delayed. A
dozen European countries were moving towards
uncharted territories of monetary and some sort
of political union.Latin America was in the middle
of a huge debt crisis and of a “lost decade” with
very high or even hyperinflations, foreign debt
defaults and large budget deficits. Unavoidable
policy reforms were delayed increasing the eco-
nomic costs and leading to crisis. The Soviet
Bloc was about to collapse and when it did, it
opened a Pandora’s box of politico-economic
questions.
It was increasingly difficult to fit all of the above
complexities and varieties of experience into tradi-
tional models of economic policy in which benevo-
lent social planners maximize the utility of a repre-
sentative individual. Therefore the New Political
Economics acknowledged as a starting point that
economic policy should not be modelled as if it
were chosen by institutional-free social planners.If
one wants to understand how policymaking actual-
ly occurs and how to move towards optimality, one
needs to acknowledge that, instead, economic poli-
cies are chosen by politicians, facing elections in
democracies or with other political constraints in
non-democracies. More specifically, and this brings
us closer to my specific topic: different electoral
systems may lead to different strategic interactions
amongst political agents, such as elected represen-
tatives, the voters, or party organizations.
Electoral rules and economic policy
One of the topics that has received much interest –
including in a previous CESifo Munich Lecture by
Guido Tabellini and in the book that followed by
Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini (2003) – is the
effect of electoral institutions on economics outcomes.
Electoral systems vary a great deal across countries,
from a first-past-the-post majoritarian systems of
Britain to an almost fully proportional system in
Sweden and to proportionality with thresholds like
Germany. In a proportional system the fraction of
votes cast by the citizens for a party translates more
or less exactly to the same fraction of seats in the leg-
islation. In majoritarian systems this is not generally
the case, and there is a prize for winning the majori-
ty in a district or plurality, depending on the system.
Some of the implications of these differences are
clear: in a proportional system without thresholds
even very small parties can gain representation,1
while with thresholds very small parties are not
viable but it is still possible to have a multitude of
parties if they overcome the threshold. In general, in
majoritarian systems (and there are various types),
parties have an incentive to form blocs.Thus,majori-
tarian systems tend to produce blocs of two parties
or at least of two coalitions, the so-called Duverger’s
law. Whether or not such coalitions or blocs remain
stable or squabble after the election varies across
countries.We also have presidential systems in which
presidents are elected by the people, as in the US
and France, and hold substantial executive power,
while in other countries the president is elected by
parliament and holds either a purely ceremonial role
or some executive and procedural power.
The key question is: Do different electoral systems
and various voting rules have different effects on eco-
nomic policy in general and fiscal policy in particular? 
In the literature we can find a few answers, not all in
agreement with each other. According to the
Chicago School, electoral laws really do not matter
that much. Lobbying pressure will determine poli-
cies regardless of the details of electoral laws. What
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matters is lobbies’ abilities to gain voice in the polit-
ical arena and this has very little to do with the
details of the electoral law.2
According to the line of thought of the Cultural-
Social Capital School, what really matters is not the
institutions of the polity per se but deeper variables
like different cultures, various anthropological vari-
ables, measures of social capital and trust.
Economists are (re)discovering the importance of
culture in explaining attitudes towards the economy
and economic policy. While I am not aware of a
paper that directly tests the superiority of “culture”
versus “electoral institutions”, the argument is “in
the air” so to speak.3
For the Institutionalist School, electoral laws matter
because they affect the political equilibrium, the
nature and structure of party systems and therefore
it has profound effects on policies. A vast literature
in political science – the extensive work by Persson
and Tabellini (e.g.2003),the work by Milesi-Ferretti,
Perotti and Rostagno (2001) and many others in eco-
nomics – holds this view.
My view is somewhere in between.It is true that lob-
bies can manoeuvre around the intricacies of elec-
toral laws to buy favours. It is also true that deeper
cultural and social variables are critical. However,
electoral rules are relevant. But the question is how
to disentangle their specific effect.
How can electoral rules matter?
Electoral rules affect the nature of party systems,the
composition of legislature and the relationship
between the executive and the legislature.Thus rules
can have an impact on economic policy through their
effect on the structure of parties. Here are a few
examples discussed in the literature:
i) Proportional electoral systems with large coali-
tion governments produce larger budget deficits
and have difficulties in promoting fiscal stabi-
lization.
ii) In proportional electoral systems social spending
is higher and the welfare systems more generous
because of more diffuse representation of vari-
ous groups.
iii) Presidential systems are more pro-active; they sta-
bilize sooner and spend less in social expenditures.
iv) In US cities different voting rules for electing
representatives affect racial minority representa-
tion and policies in that respect.
These are only a few examples of the effects of elec-
toral rules on policy outcomes, but there are many
others.The critical question,however,is the following:
how can electoral institutions be considered explana-
tory variables, i.e.“exogenous” variables in economic
jargon? After all they are chosen by individuals in dif-
ferent societies, they are not randomly assigned. So
why do different societies choose different rules? 
Let me begin by reviewing the arguments in favour
of treating electoral rules as “primitive”, exogenous
courses of economic polities.
Electoral laws are costly and complicated to change
This is correct, and this consideration would make it
reasonable to use electoral rules as explanatory vari-
ables (predetermined or exogenous) as an explana-
tion for economic policies and outcomes. However,
the original introduction of the electoral law may
reflect stable historical characteristics of a society
that may be correlated with what one wants to
explain with the electoral law. For example, we will
discuss below how differences in social policies in
the US and continental Europe stem from deeper
variables ingrained in history than from different
electoral rules, or to put it differently: the choice of
electoral rules depends on those variables.
In other words, even though electoral rules may be
relatively stable over time,they may still be correlat-
ed with other stable characteristics of a society, and
the latter may be the true explanatory variable.
Stability of electoral rules is not a completely valid
explanation for regarding them as exogenous.
In addition, electoral laws are not always so stable.
In the first half of the nineteenth century and with
the extension of the franchise, they changed fre-
quently. But even after this turbulent period, elec-
toral rules were not cast in stone. In fact, in some
cases electoral laws changed frequently. France
after World War I, Italy after 1990, and Eastern
Europe after democratization are some examples.
Many former communist countries started with
very proportional systems and then adjusted them
in a more majoritarian direction. Countries where
2 For a recent example of this argument, see C. Mulligan and X.
Sole I Martin (2004).
3 See however G.Tabellini (2005).Communist parties were still dominant stayed with
majoritarian systems and then slowly moved
towards proportionality. In Latin America there
were several movements back and forth from dicta-
torships to democracies. Often the electoral laws
that are chosen depend upon the nature of the pre-
vious dictatorship. For instance, stringent term lim-
its in that region stem from the fear of a return of a
one-person dictatorial rule common in Latin Ame-
rica in the fairly recent past.
France underwent 12 reforms of electoral laws from
1870 to 1988.Virtually all of the reforms can be tied
to the desire of whoever was holding power to
increase its expected electoral benefits – at least the
perceived benefits. Here are a few examples. In
1945 a proportional system was adopted for fear of
too much concentration of power. Christian
Democrats and Conservatives were afraid of a
Communist victory. In 1951 there were some modi-
fications introduced to favour the parties then in
office.In 1958 a constitutional reform towards pres-
identialism instigated by de Gaulle tried to avoid
the problems of political deadlock caused by pro-
portional representation and too many parties. In
1985 the Socialists realized that the chances of
maintaining power in the National Assembly were
low so they returned to presidential rule to limit the
size of the defeat.
In fact,electoral laws do not change that often,but a
higher frequency of changes increases future fre-
quency of changes.Why? There are two reasons.One
is that if a constitution makes it too easy to change
electoral laws then it is relatively easy for a govern-
ment to change the rules in its favour. The second
reason is that the longer rules remain unchanged,the
more they acquire a status of “focal point” and of
“tradition” so that the reputational costs of a gov-
ernment trying to strategically manipulate them may
become quite high.
Risk aversion and unpredictability of results of
changes
For a ruling group to change laws one has to be sure
about the outcome. A high degree of uncertainty
about the effect of a rule change might lead to a sta-
tus quo bias and low frequency of change. Even
when the institutional costs of changing the laws are
relatively low, risk aversion about not knowing what
the result would be may lead parties to keep the law
unchanged. An example is Germany in 1947. After
the war and after the Nazi period there was much
uncertainty about the distribution of preferences
across the population, with considerable uncertainty
about which party would have benefited from alter-
native rules. The result of this uncertainty was pro-
portionality, corrected with a relatively high thresh-
old to avoid the Weimar problems of excess frag-
mentation. A majoritarian system would have pro-
duced a clear winner and a clear looser;risk aversion
coupled with a large uncertainty made this prospect
too risky for everyone.
Thus risk aversion may increase the stability of rules,
but as we discussed above stability is not a synonym
for being exogenous.
Role of former colonizers
Former colonies often adopted the electoral rules of
former colonizers. For example, India adopted a
majoritarian system and never moved to full propor-
tionality despite the fact that a religiously fractional-
ized society may be prone to adopt more propor-
tionality. In this case then to some extent electoral
rules are exogenous to the country in question
because they are imposed from above.
Obviously however, not all countries were colonies,
and in fact much of the work on the effect of elec-
toral rules on economic outcomes is on OECD coun-
tries that have never been colonies.
Who chooses electoral laws?
Let us assume that electoral laws matter in the sense
that they seem to be correlated with different politi-
cal equilibria and party structure. The next is the
chicken or the egg question: what causes what? Let
me explain with an example.Duverger’s law suggests
that in a first-past-the-post system only two parties
emerge in equilibrium. But perhaps in systems
where we only have two dominant parties they
choose a first-past-the-post system because such
choice is in their interest to reduce the competition
of smaller parties. Conversely, proportionality of
electoral rules creates many parties and a system
that is sometimes accused of not being capable of
delivering fast and pro-active legislation because of
the veto power of even small parties in ruling coali-
tions. But perhaps multiparty fragmented systems
reflect fragmentation of society, and proportional
systems are chosen precisely because it is the only
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way to grant representation to all groups and avoid
social conflict.
In a narrow sense one may argue that electoral sys-
tems derive from the desire of ruling elites and rul-
ing parties to maintain their power.So electoral rules
change if the ruling elites are threatened by changes
of conditions that require a change in electoral
rules to maintain power. An obvious example of
changes in conditions is the introduction of univer-
sal suffrage. As we discuss below the introduction
of universal suffrage often leads to a move towards
proportionality if the ruling elites feel that they
cannot control growing socialist parties and believe
that maintaining a majoritarian system might lead
to a socialist victory. On the other hand sometimes
proportional electoral systems are in the interests
of the socialists and they obtain them as a result of
strikes and street revolts despite the opposition of
ruling elites.
In general, history, distribution of power within soci-
ety of various ethnic and religious groups, distribu-
tion of income and culture are determinants of elec-
toral rules.All of these variables also determine pol-
icy preferences. Therefore the correlation between
electoral rules and policy outcome may be overstat-
ed or simply be the result of third factors. Also the
initial level of income inequality may affect the
choice of electoral systems. Even culture may mat-
ter. Certain cultures may have a preference for
broad participation rather than delegation, propor-
tionality versus majoritarianism.
Normative versus positive models
Extensive work on normative models of constitu-
tions considers the question of how constitutions
should be written behind a Rawlsian veil of igno-
rance. But in reality constitutions and electoral
reforms are not chosen behind a veil of ignorance.
Those who change the rules generally know who will
benefit or at least they can form expectations.In this
case electoral rules are chosen strategically to bene-
fit (or at least attempt to benefit) the ruling coali-
tion. There are of course some more or less egre-
gious examples.In Italy in 2005,a reform of the elec-
toral law was introduced immediately before the
election, allegedly to make the system more propor-
tional and, by doing so, minimizing the expected loss
of the ruling majority.The ruling coalition did indeed
lose,by a handful of votes,and because of some tech-
nicalities, even though they were well behind in the
polls. A case in the opposite direction was New
Zealand in 1997, which witnessed a move toward
proportionality (a German type model) as a result of
the recommendation of a technical, non-partisan
commission that ruled against the stated interests of
the two major parties.
These two examples suggest that one can certainly
not assume that changes in the electoral rule are dic-
tated by a welfare-maximizing social planner, nor
can they be thought of as being chosen behind a veil
of ignorance.But often ruling majorities do not have
a completely free hand in choosing the rules that
maximize their narrow interests. In fact in some
countries electoral rule can be changed only with
qualified majorities, which is a good check against
excessive manipulation by narrow-minded ruling
majorities.
Summing up and two examples
Electoral laws are not irrelevant as determinants of
political equilibria and economic policy, but treat-
ing them simply as given, not changeable and ex-
ogenous, can lead to seriously misleading results.
Especially if one is interested in long-run phenom-
ena like the size of the welfare state, the evolution
of minority protection in voting rights and the
structure of groups of society’s representation in
the polity, one has to keep the endogeneity of elec-
toral laws in mind.
So what is left for the student of electoral laws and
economic policy? Unfortunately what is left is a dif-
ficult task that cannot simply be to look at electoral
rules as exogenous and look at the correlation
between such rules and economic policy. One has to
go deeper. Here are two examples.
Example 1: The choice of proportionality and the
effects of proportionality on welfare spending
Solid empirical evidence suggests a strong correlation
between proportionality of electoral systems and the
level of social spending. This is one of the major
themes of the book by Persson and Tabellini (2003).
There is indeed a strong correlation between the
generosity of welfare systems and the level of social
spending as a fraction of GDP. However, in many
countries the introduction of proportionality has alot to do with the strength of Socialists and
Communist parties, which, of course, were also in
favour of generous welfare states.So proportionality
of the electoral system may be only an intermediate
variable, not the original cause
A prime example of this relationship is a compari-
son between the United States and Western conti-
nental Europe, an issue addressed in a book by Ed
Glaeser and myself (2004). In Europe proportional-
ity was introduced as a result of the increase in the
power of Marxist parties after World War I and II.
Two forces were at play. First growing socialist and
communist parties demanded representation in
post-World War I. Before the war only Belgium,
Finland, Portugal and Sweden had some form of
proportional representation. Between 1917 and
1920 Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy and
the Netherlands adopted various forms of propor-
tional representation, often in the aftermath of left-
ist insurgencies.In some cases the leftist movements
were peaceful (Switzerland, Netherlands, Sweden in
1907), in others violent (Belgium, Italy, Germany).
In the latter case conservative forces had to acqui-
esce to the demands of the leftists who dominated
the streets. That is, from the point of view of maxi-
mization of electoral advantages, ruling elites would
have preferred a majoritarian system but the pres-
sure from the protesters and the weakened armies
after World War I made it impossible for the ruling
elites not to concede proportionality to semi-insur-
gent movements.Second,when Marxist parties were
very strong it was even in the interest of ruling par-
ties to introduce proportionality to avoid defeat.
This was the case,for example,in Italy and France in
the aftermath of World War II.In Sweden in 1909 at
the time of the extension of the franchise, the con-
servative party, being afraid of losing against radical
and socialist parties, changed the laws to create a
proportional system.
Thus, the reason why the US did not adopt a pro-
portional representation system is because of the
lack of pressure from a socialist movement in this
country, contrary to most countries in continental
Western Europe. In the US, communist parties were
weak and could not impose on ruling elites the
choice of proportional representation. It was indeed
debated, and in some cases adopted. The state of
Illinois adopted proportional representation in 1860.
In the first thirty years of the twentieth century sev-
eral cities,especially in Ohio,did the same.But it did
not catch on because with the extension of the fran-
chise it became clear that proportional representa-
tion would have allowed the election of blacks and
representatives of the small Socialist or even
Communist parties. In the south not only propor-
tional representation was not adopted after the abo-
lition of slavery but a variety of measures were intro-
duced to disenfranchise blacks.
Why didn’t the US have a strong communist party as
in European countries? This is a question that
already received attention by Engels, and later by
Sombart in the early twentieth century. In my book
with Ed Glaeser, mentioned above, we discuss in
detail several reasons.First is the role of racial frag-
mentation of the American working class. As
already recognized by Engels and Sombart, ethnic
diversity made it more difficult to develop a unified
and cohesive, working class sentiment in the US,
more so than in continental Europe and this made
it more difficult for communist organizers in the
US. The open frontier to the west allowed some
respite from the social tension in eastern US cities
and the countryside. The low density and high dis-
tances between cities made it more difficult for
communist movements to organize.Finally,much of
the communist uprising in Europe came after the
devastation of World Wars I and II.The US did not
suffer such devastation.
The bottom line is that the effect of proportional
representation on welfare policies needs to be
understood in the context of the deeper historical
and sociological variables that led at the same time
to the choice of proportional representation and,
amongst others, the preferences of society for wel-
fare policies achieved by the strength of socialist
movements.
Example 2: Fragmentation of society and fragmen-
tation of party systems
Multiparty systems (the result of proportional elec-
toral rules) may make policymaking more difficult
because of veto power, weak and unstable coalition
governments, etc. In particular, a large amount of
evidence shows that coalition governments have
more trouble reacting quickly to budget deficits and
often allow them to grow too much.A good example
stems from a comparison of the United Kingdom
and Italy in the 1970s and 1980s.Both countries went
through difficulties. But in the UK, despite the peri-
od of decline until the early 1980s, there were never
budget deficits of great significance. In Italy, with its
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at the time strict proportional system and multiparty
coalition governments, deficits accumulated such
that in the early 1990s the public debt to GDP ratio
was more than 120 percent.
Are multiparty systems thus responsible for budget
deficits? Perhaps, but multiparty systems may be the
results of fragmented societies, so it is really social
fragmentation that causes difficulties in policy mak-
ing not the fragmentation of party systems per se.
Should we expect more diverse societies (ethnically,
linguistically, religiously) to have more parties? This
is the message of work carried out on OECD coun-
tries by political scientists like Lijphart (1977). In
fact, if we imagine a constitutional assembly whose
goal is to have representation of all societal groups,
more fragmentation of the population will lead to a
choice of party structures that enables many groups
to feel represented and to the choice of an electoral
rule that allows many parties to be represented, i.e.
proportional rule.Therefore,multiparty systems and
electoral rules that allow the existence of many par-
ties are not the cause of policy inefficiencies; they
merely reflect the cleavages of society. In fragment-
ed societies it is difficult to make polices, regardless
of the nature of party systems.
Therefore it would be incorrect to conclude that
proportional representation and multiparty sys-
tems are responsible for the breakdown of policy
making, delays in reforms, etc. Multiparty systems
may be the product of fragmented societies. This
fragmentation is what ultimately determines the
policy failures discussed above. In fact, one may
make an even stronger argument: proportional
representation and a multiparty system may be
the only feasible plan for a fragmented and diverse
society. Alternative rules that do not allow broad
representation in these types of societies may be
even worse, leading to social conflict, tension, even
violence.
Whether or not multiethnic societies generate more
parties and more participation of various groups
depends on the nature of who writes the constitu-
tion and determines the distribution of power. If a
group (be it religious, ethnic or linguistic) is domi-
nant at the constitutional table, it may choose rules
that allow it to rule the country without opposition,
in the extreme eliminating democracy, in less
extreme cases choosing systems that do not allow
the non-ruling opposition to interfere. Aghion,
Alesina and Trebbi (2004) show that in a vast sam-
ple including all countries in the world, less pro-
tection of minority rights can be observed in so-
cieties with greater ethnic fragmentation, another
indication that constitutions are not chosen behind
a veil of ignorance. There is then a difference
between advanced democracies and autocracies. In
the former more diversity in society leads to more
proportionality, in the latter more diversity may
lead to one group seeking power at the expense of
the others.
Conclusions
The study of the effect of electoral law on party for-
mation and policy outcomes is complicated because
electoral laws are endogenous, i.e. they respond to
socio-political economic forces. Especially in a long-
run perspective and for cross-country comparisons,
seeing electoral laws as predetermined or exogenous
may lead to misleading results,and it is essential that
the evolution of laws is carefully considered. The
same applies to institutions more generally, not only
electoral laws.
Do institutions in general and electoral institutions
in particular evolve towards optimality? Douglass
North (1990) argues that they do,since an evolution-
ary principle,namely only wealth or utility-maximiz-
ing institutions, survives. However, he then argued
that transaction costs (which are often not well-spec-
ified) may interfere with the move towards optimal-
ity of institutional design.The arguments developed
here serve as a clarification of what these transaction
costs are. They are due to the fact that institutions
are chosen endogenously by groups of society that
have power and intend to keep it. These groups are
not maximizing optimality for society as a whole but
operate in their own self-interest.
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